Background: Expanded newborn screening generates incidental results, notably carrier results. Yet newborn screening programmes typically restrict parental choice regarding receipt of this non-health serving genetic information. Healthcare providers play a key role in educating families or caring for screened infants and have strong beliefs about the management of incidental results. Methods: To inform policy on disclosure of infant sickle cell disorder (SCD) carrier results, a mixed-methods study of healthcare providers was conducted in Ontario, Canada, to understand attitudes regarding result management (...) using a cross-sectional survey (N = 1615) and semistructured interviews (N = 42). Results: Agreement to reasons favouring disclosure of SCD carrier results was high (65.1%–92.7%) and to reasons opposing disclosure was low (4.1%–18.1%). Genetics professionals expressed less support for arguments favouring disclosure (35.3%–78.8%), and more agreement with arguments opposing disclosure (15.7%–51.9%). A slim majority of genetics professionals (51.9%) agreed that a reason to avoid disclosure was the importance of allowing the child to decide to receive results. Qualitatively, there was a perceived “duty” to disclose, that if the clinician possessed the information, the clinician could not withhold it. Discussion: While a majority of respondents perceived a duty to disclose the incidental results of newborn screening, the policy implications of these attitudes are not obvious. In particular, policy must balance descriptive ethics (ie, what providers believe) and normative ethics (ie, what duty-based principles oblige), address dissenting opinion and consider the relevance of moral principles grounded in clinical obligations for public health initiatives. (shrink)

pt. 1. A critique of current educational aims.--pt. 2. Reason.--pt. 3. Education and reason.

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

A critical and constructive discussion of philosophical questions which have particular bearing on the formulation of educational aims.

R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

R F Dearden; Competition in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–133, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

R F Dearden; Competition in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–133, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

R F Dearden; Education and Politics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–156, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.198.

R F Dearden; Education and Politics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–156, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.198.

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

R. F. Atkinson; XIII*—Explanation in History, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 241–256, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

In Chapter 4 of his essay Utilitarianism, “Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is susceptible,” J. S. Mill undertakes to prove, in some sense of that term, the principle of utility. It has very commonly been argued that in the course of this “proof” Mill commits two very obvious fallacies. The first is the naturalistic fallacy which he is held to commit when he argues that since “the only proof capable of being given that an object is (...) visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner … the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.”1 Here Mill appears to hold that “X is desirable ”—a value judgment—follows deductively from “People desire x”—a factual statement. And the second is the fallacy of composition which seems to be involved in Mill'zs argument that since “each person's happiness is a good to that person … the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.”2. (shrink)

R F Dearden; Freedom and the Development of Autonomy: a reply to Victor Quinn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–27.

R F Dearden; Freedom and the Development of Autonomy: a reply to Victor Quinn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–27.